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Fixing Faults in the Current Default Judgment
Framework
ARTHUR J. PARK∗
I.

INTRODUCTION

The current default judgment system is filled with problems. Default
judgments are routinely set aside based upon the party’s “excusable neglect”1 for failing to timely answer. In such cases, the defaulting party’s
negligence is essentially condoned because the non-defaulting party is not
properly compensated for the delay and the defaulting party is not adequately reprimanded. Even after obtaining a default judgment, the nondefaulting party may have its victory disappear if a motion to set aside is
filed shortly thereafter. On the other hand, some parties involved in litigation are ambushed with a default based on improper service. By sitting on
the judgment without giving notice or attempting to collect, the nondefaulting party can even manipulate the one-year cutoff date in Rule 60 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure regarding the arguments that can be
made in the motion to set aside.2 Fortunately, there are some simple solutions to improve the default judgment framework.
II. HISTORY OF DEFAULT JUDGMENTS
The major components of the current default judgment framework
have been in place since adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

∗ Associate Attorney with Brewster, Morhous, Cameron, Caruth, Moore, Kersey & Stafford, PLLC in Bluefield, West Virginia. J.D., University of Mississippi; B.A., University of
Georgia. The Author’s practice consists primarily of insurance defense in Virginia and
West Virginia. Special thanks to Professor Michael Hoffheimer, Kermit J. Moore, and Jack
L. Park, Jr. for reviewing previous drafts and offering their insightful suggestions.
1. Excusable neglect can include the illness or death of a party or counsel, confusion
resulting from the withdrawal of counsel, difficulties because the defendant is from out-ofstate, misunderstandings between multiple defendants, clerical error, miscalculation of time,
or honest mistakes. See infra Part III.C.2.
2. See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(c)(1).
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in the 1930s.3 The enactment of Rule 554 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure represented “the joining of the equity decree pro confesso . . .
and the judgment by default.”5 Thus, a brief look at the history of default
judgments from both the equitable and legal side is instructive.
The equitable decree pro confesso can be traced back to the days of
the Roman Emperor Justinian.6 The initial English practice was to allow a
decree pro confesso only if the defendant “had appeared but failed to file an
answer after a demurrer was overruled.”7 The default was not applied
broadly because the courts were cautious to accept as true every “fruitful
fancy . . . a counsel could invent, suggest, or put into a bill.”8 If the defendant failed to appear, the plaintiff had to request an order of sequestration against the defendant’s real and personal property (thus preventing the
defendant from entering or using his property).9 If the defendant still failed
to appear, the court would hold him in contempt.10 Only once the defendant was forced to finally appear, “either to release the sequestration or to
fulfill the contempt order,” was a decree pro confesso available.11
English practice concerning default judgments was changed drastically in 1732 with the enactment of the Process Act.12 The Process Act stated
that a court could issue an equitable decree pro confesso even if the defendant did not appear.13 The Act required that,
upon good showing to the court by plaintiff, the court could: first, place and
publish the process in the London Gazette; second, publish the process on
“some Lord’s Day, immediately after divine service, in the parish church of
the parish;” and finally, post the process at some public place in the juris14
diction of the court.

The court could now enter a decree pro confesso after the plaintiff established that service had been published in accordance with the statute.15
3. See John R. Hardin, Asserting Failure to State a Claim After Default Judgment Under Both the Federal and Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, 30 U. MEM. L. REV. 131, 141
(1999).
4. FED. R. CIV. P. 55.
5. FED. R. CIV. P. 55 advisory committee’s note.
6. Hardin, supra note 3, at 134.
7. Id.
8. Hawkins v. Crook, (1729) 24 Eng. Rep. 860 (Ch.) 860; 2 P. Wms. 556 (Eng.).
9. Hardin, supra note 3, at 134.
10. Id. at 135.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. The Process Act, 1732, 5 Geo. 2, c. 25 (Eng.).
14. Hardin, supra note 3, at 135 (citations omitted).
15. Id.
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Once such a decree was entered, the defendant had seven years in which to
appear.16 If the defendant did not petition to set aside the decree within
seven years, the decree remained “absolutely confirmed.”17
The early American system, including the Federal Equity Rules of
1822, followed the Process Act English model for a decree pro confesso:
By our rules a decree pro confesso may be had if the defendant, on being
served with process, fails to appear within the time required; or if, having
appeared, he fails to plead, demur, or answer to the bill within the time limited for that purpose; or if he fails to answer after a former plea, demurrer,
18
or answer is overruled or declared insufficient.

Once a decree pro confesso was entered, the court was to “decree upon the
naked allegations of the complainants’ bill, and give the relief proper to the
case.”19 The court could rule on “distinct and positive” allegations but had
to receive additional proof when the allegations were “defective or
vague.”20 After a decree pro confesso was entered, the defendant was absolutely barred from any challenge that was not apparent on the face of the
bill.21
On the law side, courts of common law were allowed to enter a decree
of nil dicit when the defendant had failed to plead, regardless of whether he
or she had appeared.22 Thus, the distinguishing feature of the decree nil
dicit was the court’s ability to find a defendant in default for failing to file
even without an appearance.23 Defined literally, the term nil dicit means
“he says nothing”24 and has also been viewed as “the technical form of
judgment to be rendered where the defendant has entered a general appearance, but has failed to plead, or where, having pleaded, his or her plea has
been stricken out or is withdrawn or abandoned and no further defense is
made.”25 The U.S. Supreme Court explained that, where a default nil dicit
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id.
Id.
Thomson v. Wooster, 114 U.S. 104, 112 (1885).
Williams v. Corwin, 1 Hopk. Ch. 471, 476 (N.Y. Ch. 1824).
Id.
10A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2681 (3d ed. 1998).
22. See Davis v. Davis, (1739) 26 Eng. Rep. 410 (Ch.) 412; 2 Atk. 21, 23 (Eng.); Hawkins v. Crook, (1729) 24 Eng. Rep. 860 (Ch.) 862; 2 P. Wms. 556, 558–59.
23. See Florida v. Georgia, 58 U.S. 478, 517 (1854) (Campbell, J., dissenting) (citing
Peto v. Attorney General, (1827) 148 Eng. Rep. 772 (Exch.) 772; 1 Y. & J. 509, 509) (“If he
fails to appear, it is a nil dicit; and if he appears and will not answer, a decree pro confesso
is taken.”).
24. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 480 (9th ed. 2009).
25. 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 253 (2009).
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was obtained, “judgment is immediately given in debt, or in all cases where
the thing demanded is certain; but where the matter sued for consists in
damages, a judgment interlocutory is given; after which a writ of inquiry
goes to ascertain the damages, and then the judgment follows.”26
The equitable pro confesso and the legal nil dicit were generally recognized as being quite similar. The United States Supreme Court noted
that “[t]he method in equity of taking a bill pro confesso is consonant to the
rule and practice of the courts at law, where . . . the defendant makes default by nil dicit.”27 The analogy between the nil dicit proceeding in law
and the pro confesso proceeding in equity “is obvious and striking.”28 As
noted above, the two doctrines were ultimately combined in Rule 55 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.29
III. THE CURRENT DEFAULT JUDGMENT FRAMEWORK
A. Purpose of Default Judgment
The purpose of default judgments is to protect a diligent party, “lest he
be faced with interminable delay and continued uncertainty as to his rights”
whenever “the adversary process has been halted because of an essentially
unresponsive party.”30 The theory behind default judgments is that, by its
failure to timely answer, the defaulting party implicitly “admits the cause
of action is valid, admits [it] has no defense, and consents to suffer judgment.”31 When these presumptions turn out to be inaccurate, the default
judgment stands as a penalty for the party’s failure to comply with the procedural rules and deadlines to answer.32
Default judgments are also subject to competing policy considera26. Thomson v. Wooster, 114 U.S. 104, 111 (1885) (quoting Bills Taken Pro Confesso,
(1744) 22 Eng. Rep. 152 (Ch.) 154 n.3; 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 178, 179 n.3) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
27. Id. at 111 (quoting Bills Taken Pro Confesso, 22 Eng. Rep. at 154 n.3; 2 Eq. Cas.
Abr. at 179 n.3) (internal quotation marks omitted).
28. Id.
29. For more on the current rules of civil procedure pertaining to default judgments, see
infra Part III.B.
30. H. F. Livermore Corp. v. Aktiengesellschaft Gebruder Loepfe, 432 F.2d 689, 691
(D.C. Cir. 1970); see also Adam Owen Glist, Enforcing Courtesy: Default Judgments and
the Civility Movement, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 757, 765 (2000) (“The mechanism of default
fosters efficiency and discourages delay by severely penalizing dilatory or procrastinating
conduct.”).
31. Keeler Bros. v. Yellowstone Valley Nat’l. Bank, 235 F. 270, 270 (D. Mont. 1916).
32. Id.
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tions.33 “[I]t is necessary for the court to balance what are at times conflicting policy goals: the need for prompt and efficient handling of litigation in
the federal courts by sound application of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and
the attainment of a just resolution of the particular dispute before the
court.”34 On one hand, the court’s procedural rules must be respected and
enforced:
One of the basic purposes of the Rules of Federal Procedure is to secure the
“speedy” determination of pending litigation. Since Magna Carta, delay
has been recognized as pro tanto denial of justice. In Shakespeare’s Hamlet “the law’s delay” is condemned. The evil is an old one. It has merely
become more widespread as the number of pending cases has increased in
our urban civilization. Theoretically and ideally the object of procedural
rules is to accord a plaintiff the same relief which he would receive if the
case were decided immediately at the moment of filing. For the wrong (if
any) has then occurred; the remedy should also be available at the same
time. Calendar control by the Courts and the setting of fixed dates for the
various steps to be taken in the course of litigation are among the means by
which it is sought to eliminate delay. The bar must realize, and we declare
it as emphatically as we can, that these dates fixed by law, rule, or court or35
der mean something. They are not empty formalities.

In the words of Judge Posner, “[t]he threat of default is one of the district
judges’ most important tools for obtaining compliance with litigation
schedules.”36 When delay and noncompliance are condoned, the courts are
unable to effectively manage their overburdened dockets.37
The competing policy consideration is the judicial preference for just
resolution of disputes on the merits. Since courts prefer to decide cases on
33. See Bankers Mortg. Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 73, 77 (5th Cir. 1970) (indicating that courts must preserve the balance between the “sanctity of final judgments” and the
desire that “justice be done in light of all the facts”).
34. Gray v. John Jovino Co., 84 F.R.D. 46, 47 (E.D. Tenn. 1979) (citing 6 WM. MOORE
ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 55.10 (2d ed. 1978)); see also Gomes v. Williams,
420 F.2d 1364, 1366 (10th Cir. 1970) (recognizing that the judicial preference for trial on
merits “is counterbalanced by considerations of social goals, justice and expediency, a
weighing process which lies largely within the domain of the trial judge’s discretion”).
35. Canup v. Miss. Valley Barge Line Co., 31 F.R.D. 282, 283 (W.D. Pa. 1962) (citations omitted); see also Nelson v. Coleman Co., 41 F.R.D. 7, 9 (D. S.C. 1966) (“[T]he process of the court is neither to be disregarded or ignored. If this were not so, the orderly administration of justice would lack its most important policing feature.”).
36. Anilina Fabrique de Colorants v. Aakash Chems. & Dyestuffs, Inc., 856 F.2d 873,
882 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J., dissenting); see also 10A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra
note 21, § 2693 (stating that entries of default and default judgment “are significant weapons for enforcing compliance with the rules of procedure and therefore facilitate the speedy
determination of litigation”).
37. Anilina, 856 F.2d at 882.
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the merits,38 the entry of a default judgment is not favored by the law.39 “In
[the] final analysis, a court has the responsibility to do justice between man
and man; and general principles cannot justify denial of a party’s fair day in
court except upon a serious showing of willful default.”40 State courts also
follow this general rule.41
B. Rules of Civil Procedure
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,42 default judgments are
governed by Rule 55 and Rule 60. One issue that practitioners (and even
some judges) tend to confuse is the difference between a “default” and a
“default judgment.” The court clerk enters a default when a party fails to
file an appropriate responsive pleading. “When a party against whom a
judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise
defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must
enter the party’s default.”43 The most common situation involving the entry of default occurs when a named defendant fails to file an answer after
being served.44 It is important to note that a default always precedes a de-

38. See, e.g., Gomes, 420 F.2d at 1366 (“The preferred disposition of any case is upon
its merits and not by default judgment.”); Exxon Corp. v. Thomason, 504 S.E.2d 676, 677
(Ga. 1998) (recognizing a “strong public policy . . . favoring resolution of cases on the merits”).
39. See, e.g., In re Jones Truck Lines, Inc., 63 F.3d 685, 688 (8th Cir. 1995) (noting that
default judgment should be a “rare judicial act”); Sun Bank of Ocala v. Pelican Homestead
& Sav. Ass’n., 874 F.2d 274, 276 (5th Cir. 1989) (“Default judgments are a drastic remedy,
not favored by the Federal Rules and resorted to by courts only in extreme situations.”);
Charlton L. Davis & Co., P.C. v. Fedder Data Ctr., Inc., 556 F.2d 308, 309 (5th Cir. 1977)
(“Judgments by default are drastic remedies and should only be resorted to in extreme situations.”); Affanato v. Merrill Bros., 547 F.2d 138, 140 (1st Cir. 1977) (“[D]efault judgment
is . . . a drastic sanction that should be employed only in an extreme situation.”).
40. Gill v. Stolow, 240 F.2d 669, 670 (2d Cir. 1957).
41. See, e.g., Johnson v. Am. Nat’l. Red Cross, 569 S.E.2d 242, 246 (Ga. Ct. App.
2002), aff’d 578 S.E.2d 106 (Ga. 2003); McCain v. Dauzat, 791 So. 2d 839, 843 (Miss.
2001) (“Default judgments are not favored,” and reasonable doubt “should be resolved in
favor . . . [of] hearing the case on its merits.”); Parsons v. Consol. Gas Supply Corp., 256
S.E.2d 758, 762 (W. Va. 1979) (“[W]e have established as a basic policy that cases should
be decided on their merits, and consequently default judgments are not favored and a liberal
construction should be accorded a Rule 60(b) motion to vacate a default order.”).
42. Most states have adopted rules based on the federal model. Compare, e.g., FED. R.
CIV. P. 55, 60, with MISS. R. CIV. P. 55, 60, and W. VA. R. CIV. P. 55, 60. But see VA. SUP.
CT. R. 3:19 (indicating that not all states have adopted the federal rules).
43. FED. R. CIV. P. 55(a).
44. Entry of default under Rule 55(a) would also apply to plaintiffs failing to answer a
counterclaim and third-party defendants failing to answer a third-party complaint. See Pall

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol34/iss1/5

6

Park: Fixing Faults in the Current Default Judgment Framework
PARK.DOCX

2011]

1/9/12 12:01 PM

FIXING FAULTS

161

fault judgment, and the entry of default does not include an award of damages.
Once the clerk has entered a default, a default judgment can be pursued. There are two ways to procure a default judgment.45 First, the court
clerk may enter default judgment when the “plaintiff’s claim is for a sum
certain or a sum that can be made certain by computation.”46 Second, the
court may enter judgment when the amount in dispute is not for a sum certain.47 At this stage, the court may hold a hearing to “(A) conduct an accounting; (B) determine the amount of damages; (C) establish the truth of
any allegation by evidence; or (D) investigate any other matter.”48 As to
damages, “[a] default judgment must not differ in kind from, or exceed in
amount, what [was] demanded in the
pleadings.”49
Once a pleading has been properly served, Rule 55(b)(2) provides the
only notice requirement in the default judgment framework: “If the party
against whom a default judgment is sought has appeared personally or by a
representative, that party or its representative must be served with written
notice of the application at least 7 days before the hearing.”50 In the most
Corp. v. Entegris, Inc., 249 F.R.D. 48, 58 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (permitting entry of default
against plaintiff on counterclaim).
45. Although a default judgment is also available as a discovery sanction under Rule
37(b)(2)(vi), that situation involves different policy considerations and is therefore outside
the scope of this Article.
46. FED. R. CIV. P. 55(b)(1). This method also requires an affidavit showing the amount
due, but it is not available when the defaulting party is a minor or an incompetent person.
Id.
47. FED. R. CIV. P. 55(b)(2).
48. Id. Additionally, in order to protect the interests of a minor or incompetent person,
such a party must be represented by a guardian or conservator during this process. Id.
A hearing is often required for sovereigns, as the non-defaulting party must provide
additional evidence. See FED. R. CIV. P. 55(d) (“A default judgment may be entered against
the United States, its officers, or its agencies only if the claimant establishes a claim or right
to relief by evidence that satisfies the court.”); cf. Commercial Bank of Kuwait v. Rafidain
Bank, 15 F.3d 238, 242 (2d Cir. 1994) (indicating a hearing is not always required for default judgment against sovereign). The United States Code mirrors Rule 55(d):
No judgment by default shall be entered by a court of the United States or of a
State against a foreign state, a political subdivision thereof, or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state, unless the claimant establishes his claim or right
to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court.
28 U.S.C. § 1608(e) (2006).
49. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(c).
50. FED. R. CIV. P. 55(b)(2). Surprisingly, the moving party is not required to give any
form of notice to the defaulting party for the entry of default under Rule 55(a) or for a default judgment under Rule 55(b)(1). Even the court clerk is not required to give notice to
the defaulting party. The Rules indicates that “[i]mmediately after entering an order or
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common scenario, a defendant fails to file a timely answer to a complaint.
When such a situation occurs, the defendant has not “appeared personally
or by a representative,” so no additional notice is required under Rule
55(b)(2).51
Rule 55 also provides the basic rule for how an entry of default or a
default judgment may be set aside: “The court may set aside an entry of default for good cause, and it may set aside a default judgment under Rule
60(b).”52 Rule 60(b) states:
On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; it is based on
an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or
53

(6) any other reason that justifies relief.

As to timing, “[a] motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a
reasonable time—and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) no more than a year after

judgment, the clerk must serve notice of the entry . . . on each party who is not in default for
failing to appear.” FED. R. CIV. P. 77(d)(1). However, the non-defaulting party would have
to give notice to any other parties in the litigation, but not the defaulting party, as to any motions filed. See FED. R. CIV. P. 5(a)(1)(D) (requiring written motions to be served on all parties); FED. R. CIV. P. 5(a)(2) (“No service is required on a party who is in default for failing
to appear.”).
51. In extraordinary circumstances, a party can “appear” without filing a responsive
pleading. See Lutomski v. Panther Valley Coin Exch., 653 F.2d 270, 271 (6th Cir. 1981)
(finding a conversation between defendant’s counsel and plaintiff’s counsel concerning the
suit to be sufficient to constitute appearance); Charlton L. Davis & Co., P.C. v. Fedder Data
Ctr., Inc., 556 F.2d 308, 309 (5th Cir. 1977) (determining that letters and phone calls from
defendant’s counsel constituted appearance); FROF, Inc. v. Harris, 695 F. Supp. 827, 830
(E.D. Pa. 1988) (finding that a single letter from defendant’s attorney to plaintiff’s attorney
was an appearance); Dalminter, Inc. v. Jessie Edwards, Inc., 27 F.R.D. 491, 492 (S.D. Tex.
1961) (finding that a defendant’s letter to plaintiff constituted an appearance).
52. FED. R. CIV. P. 55(c).
53. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b).
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the entry of the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding.”54
C. Case Law on Setting Aside Default Judgments
1. Factors to be Considered
When hearing a motion to set aside a default judgment,55 the court will
consider a number of factors. The federal courts have identified as many as
seven distinct factors:
(1) whether the default was willful; (2) whether setting it aside would prejudice the adversary; (3) whether a meritorious defense is presented; (4) the
nature of the defendant’s explanation for the default; (5) the good faith of
the parties; (6) the amount of money involved; (7) the timing of the mo56
tion.

Courts apply the same factors to a motion to set aside entry of default
and to a motion to set aside default judgment; however, the factors are construed more liberally in a motion to set aside a mere entry of default.57
In listing the factors, federal courts are split on whether the effective-

54. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(c)(1).
55. This motion is also sometimes referred to as a motion to vacate the judgment.
56. KPS & Assocs. v. Designs by FMC, Inc., 318 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2003). Factors
considered by state courts tend to be quite similar. See, e.g., Parsons v. Consol. Gas Supply
Corp., 256 S.E.2d 758, 762 (W. Va. 1979) (holding that the court must consider the following factors: “(1) The degree of prejudice suffered by the plaintiff from the delay in answering; (2) the presence of material issues of fact and meritorious defenses; (3) the significance
of the interests at stake; and (4) the degree of intransigence on the part of the defaulting party.”). In Georgia, the factors considered are:
[W]hether and how the opposing party will be prejudiced by opening the default; whether the opposing party elected not to raise the default issue until after
the time . . . had expired for the defaulting party to open default as a matter of
right; and whether the defaulting party acted promptly to open default upon learning no answer had been either filed or timely filed.
Ford v. Saint Francis Hosp., Inc., 490 S.E.2d 415, 419 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997). Mississippi
courts consider:
(1) [t]he nature and legitimacy of a defendant's reasons for default, i.e., whether a defendant has good cause for default; (2) whether the defendant has a colorable defense to the merits of the claim, and (3) the nature and extent of prejudice
that a plaintiff would suffer if default is set aside.
Chassaniol v. Bank of Kilmichael, 626 So. 2d 127, 135 (Miss. 1993).
57. Berthelsen v. Kane, 907 F.2d 617, 620 (6th Cir. 1990) (“The same considerations
exist when deciding whether to set aside either an entry of default or a default judgment, but
they are to be applied more liberally when reviewing an entry of default.”). The underlying
rationale is the respect for the finality of judgments.

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2011

9

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 5
PARK.DOCX

164

1/9/12 12:01 PM

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:155

ness of alternative sanctions should be considered.58 On one hand, the
Third and Fourth Circuits have expressly recognized alternative sanctions
as a factor that the district court must take into account.59 While not rejecting alternative sanctions outright, the other circuits have not found this factor to be significant.60 As discussed below, the effectiveness of alternative
sanctions is an important factor that every court should consider when hearing a motion to set aside default judgment.61
2. The Excusable Neglect Standard
Under Rule 60(b)(1), a default judgment may be set aside for “excusable neglect.” Prior to 1993, two distinct standards had developed with respect to what type of conduct constituted excusable neglect.62 The Second,
Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits took “the stance that a court should vacate
a default judgment except upon a showing of willful or culpable conduct or
bad faith on the part of the movant.”63 This liberal view is based on the judicial preference for trial on the merits and a broad construction of Rule 60
to accomplish justice.64 Under the liberal standard, excusable neglect can
include the illness or death of a party or counsel, confusion resulting from
the withdrawal of counsel, difficulties for out-of-state defendants, misunderstandings between multiple defendants, clerical error, miscalculation of

58. While there may be some overlap between Rule 37 and Rule 55 regarding the sanction issue, this essay is limited to the policy considerations of Rule 55 and the failure to
timely answer.
59. Emcasco Ins. Co. v. Sambrick, 834 F.2d 71, 73–74 (3d Cir. 1987); United States. v.
Moradi, 673 F.2d 725, 728 (4th Cir. 1982).
60. See KPS, 318 F.3d at 12 (1st Cir.); SEC v. McNulty, 137 F.3d 732, 738 (2d Cir.
1998); Swaim v. Moltan Co., 73 F.3d 711, 722 (7th Cir. 1996); Compania Interamericana
Export-Import, S.A. v. Compania Dominicana De Aviacion, 88 F.3d 948, 951 (11th Cir.
1996); In re Jones Truck Lines, Inc., 63 F.3d 685, 687 (8th Cir. 1995); Info. Sys. & Networks Corp. v. United States, 994 F.2d 792, 795 (Fed. Cir. 1993); FDIC v. Daily, 973 F.2d
1525, 1529 (10th Cir. 1992); Berthelsen, 907 F.2d at 620 (6th Cir.); Eitel v. McCool, 782
F.2d 1470, 1471–72 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. One Parcel of Real Property, 763 F.2d
181 (5th Cir. 1985); Jackson v. Beech, 636 F.2d 831, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
61. See infra Part V.C.
62. See generally Brett Warren Weathersbee, Note, No More Excuses: Refusing to
Condone Mere Carelessness or Negligence Under the “Excusable Neglect” Standard in
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1), 50 VAND. L. REV. 1619 (1997).
63. Id. at 1624–25 (citing Am. Alliance Ins. Co. v. Eagle Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 57, 61 (2nd
Cir. 1996); Amernational Indus. v. Action-Tungsram, Inc., 925 F.2d 970, 978 (6th Cir.
1991); Meadows v. Dominican Republic, 817 F.2d 517, 521–22 (9th Cir. 1987); Gross v.
Stereo Component Sys., 700 F.2d 120, 124 (3rd Cir. 1983)).
64. Id. at 1625.
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time, or honest mistakes.65
On the other hand, the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits defined excusable neglect “narrowly and expressly reject[ed] requests to vacate default judgments that result from mere carelessness or negligence.”66
This strict view is based on “ensuring finality of judgments, promoting judicial efficiency, deterring inappropriate behavior and holding clients accountable for the acts of their agent.”67 Under the strict standard, the following conduct did not constitute excusable neglect: miscommunication
with a party’s insurance company,68 failing to open mail containing service
of process before taking a vacation,69 and missing deadlines due to counsel’s heavy caseload and scheduling conflicts.70
In 1993, the United States Supreme Court discussed the “excusable
neglect” standard in the context of Rule 9006(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure.71 In short, the Court held that excusable neglect includes the failure to comply with a filing deadline that is attributable to
negligence.72 The Court stated that “Congress plainly contemplated that
the courts would be permitted, where appropriate, to accept late filings
caused by inadvertence, mistake, or carelessness, as well as by intervening
circumstances beyond the party’s control.”73 As such, the Court rejected
the strict view, discussed above, that excusable neglect should only apply
to circumstances beyond the party’s control and that attorney negligence is
always an insufficient ground.74 As to the requirement that the neglect be
“excusable,” the Court established a balancing test which requires an equitable determination “taking account of all relevant circumstances surrounding the party’s omission.”75 These factors include “the danger of prejudice
to the debtor, the length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial

65. 10A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 21, § 2695 (collecting cases).
66. Weathersbee, supra note 62, at 1628 (citing Pelican Prod. Corp. v. Marino, 893
F.2d 1143 (10th Cir. 1990); Lavespere v. Niagara Machine & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d
167, 173 (5th Cir. 1990), abrogated on other grounds by Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d
1069 (5th Cir. 1994); C.K.S. Engineers, Inc. v. White Mt. Gypsum Co., 726 F.2d 1202 (7th
Cir. 1984)); Sutherland v. ITT Cont’l Baking Co., 710 F.2d 473, 476–77 (8th Cir. 1983).
67. Weathersbee, supra note 62, at 1639.
68. Davis v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 532 F.2d 489, 490 (5th Cir. 1976).
69. CJC Holdings, Inc. v. Wright & Lato, 979 F.2d 60, 64 (5th Cir. 1992).
70. Pryor v. U.S. Postal Serv., 769 F.2d 281, 287 (5th Cir. 1985).
71. Pioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 382–83
(1993).
72. Id. at 394–95.
73. Id. at 388.
74. Id. at 391–92, 395.
75. Id. at 395.
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proceedings, the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the
reasonable control of the movant, and whether the movant acted in good
faith.”76
While its holding was limited to the bankruptcy rules, the Pioneer
Court noted that the concept of “neglect” for purposes of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) “encompass[es] situations in which the failure to
comply with a filing deadline is attributable to negligence.”77 Immediately
following the Pioneer decision in 1993, the courts expressed some doubts
regarding the proper “excusable neglect” standard for the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.78
In 1996, the Supreme Court stated that the Pioneer analysis also applies to “excusable neglect” in Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure.79 Following this additional guidance that Pioneer is not limited
to the bankruptcy context, every federal circuit court has now extended the
Pioneer test for excusable neglect to Rule 60(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.80 Under Pioneer, the bar is quite low when it comes to
76. Id.
77. Id. at 394.
78. See, e.g., United States v. RG & B Contractors, Inc., 21 F.3d 952, 956 (9th Cir.
1994) (assuming arguendo that Pioneer applied in the context of Rule 60(b)).
79. Stutson v. United States, 516 U.S. 193, 195 (1996).
80. In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., 496 F.3d 863,
866 (8th Cir. 2007) (applying Pioneer to Rule 60(b)(1)); FG Hemisphere Assocs., LLC v.
Dem. Rep. Congo, 447 F.3d 835, 838 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“While Pioneer involved ‘excusable
neglect’ under Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b)(1) . . . , the same test governs our determination
under Rule 60(b)(1).”); Jennings v. Rivers, 394 F.3d 850, 856 (10th Cir. 2005) (applying
Pioneer to Rule 60(b)(1)); George Harms Constr. Co., v. Chao, 371 F.3d 156, 163–64 (3d
Cir. 2004) (quoting Pioneer factors for excusable neglect in the context of Rule 60(b)(1));
Point PCS, LLC v. Sea Haven Realty & Constr., 95 F. App’x. 24, 27 (4th Cir. 2004) (district
court was correct to apply Pioneer factors); Silivanch v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 333 F.3d
355, 366 (2d Cir. 2003) (“‘[W]e have held that Pioneer's ‘more liberal’ definition of excusable neglect is applicable beyond the bankruptcy context . . . .’” (quoting Canfield v. Van
Atta Buick/GMC Truck Inc., 127 F.3d 248, 249–50 (2d Cir. 1997) (per curiam))); McCurry
ex rel. Turner v. Adventist Health Sys./Sunbelt, Inc., 298 F.3d 586, 595 (6th Cir. 2002) (applying Pioneer to Rule 60(b)(1)); Halicki v. La. Casino Cruises, Inc., 151 F.3d 465, 469 (5th
Cir. 1998) (“[T]he Pioneer Court’s construction of ‘excusable neglect’ was apparently generally applicable, as the Court claimed to be adopting ‘the commonly accepted meaning of
the phrase.’”); Robb v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 122 F.3d 354, 359 (7th Cir. 1997) (applying
Pioneer to Rule 60(b)(1)); Briones v. Riviera Hotel & Casino, 116 F.3d 379, 381 (9th Cir.
1997) (“We now hold that the equitable test set out in Pioneer applies to Rule 60(b).”); Pratt
v. Philbrook, 109 F.3d 18, 19 (1st Cir. 1997) (“Pioneer appeared on its face to resolve only
a narrow issue of bankruptcy practice. But by construing ‘excusable neglect,’ a phrase used
throughout the Federal Civil, Criminal and Appellate Rules of Procedure, Pioneer must be
understood to provide guidance outside the bankruptcy context.”); Cheney v. Anchor Glass
Container Corp., 71 F.3d 848, 849–50 (11th Cir. 1996) (applying Pioneer to Rule 60(b)(1));
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proving excusable neglect.81
3. Timing of the Motion to Set Aside
While the court must consider a number of factors when ruling on a
motion to set aside default judgment, the timing of the motion is usually of
critical importance.82 The timing of the motion is itself often listed as a
factor to consider.83 In addition, the time involved always colors the remaining factors. Generally, when the motion to set aside is filed shortly
after the default judgment, (1) the default was likely not willful; (2) the adversary faces little prejudice; (3) the defaulting party’s explanation is more
plausible; and (4) the defaulting party likely acted in good faith.84 When
the motion to set aside is filed long after the default judgment, (1) the deInfo. Sys. & Networks Corp. v. United States, 994 F.2d 792, 796 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (choosing
to apply the balancing test set forth in Pioneer).
Thus, the federal courts have rejected the argument that Pioneer should not be extended to FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(1). For such an argument, see Weathersbee, supra note 62,
at 1631–36.
81. See, e.g., Cheney, 71 F.3d at 850 (holding that carelessness and oversight constitute
excusable neglect). However, the states remain free to set their own standards and define
excusable neglect as used in their own rules. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-60(d)(2)
(2006) (stating that a judgment may be set aside for “[f]raud, accident, or mistake or the acts
of the adverse party unmixed with the negligence or fault of the movant”); Carter v. Ravenwood Dev. Co., 549 S.E.2d 402, 404 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (defining excusable neglect to exclude gross negligence).
82. The burden of proof remains the same, regardless of when the motion to set aside
default judgment is filed. However, some states have different procedures based on when
the motion is made. See, e.g., TEX. R. CIV. P. 306a(4) (allowing for a more lenient standard
within 30 days); VA. SUP. CT. R. 3:19(d) (allowing for a more lenient standard within 21
days); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-55(a) (stating that default may be opened as a matter of right
within 15 days).
83. See, e.g., KPS & Assocs. v. Designs by FMC, Inc., 318 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2003);
Swaim v. Moltan Co., 73 F.3d 711, 722 (7th Cir. 1996); Compania Interamericana ExportImport, S.A. v. Compania Dominicana De Aviacion, 88 F.3d 948, 951 (11th Cir. 1996); In
re Jones Truck Lines, Inc. v. Foster’s Truck & Equip. Sales, Inc., 63 F.3d 685, 687 (8th Cir.
1995).
84. See generally Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi, 635 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1981); Patapoff
v. Vollstedt’s Inc., 267 F.2d 863 (9th Cir. 1959); Reynal v. United States, 153 F.2d 929 (5th
Cir. 1945); FOC Fin. Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l City Commercial Capital Corp., 612 F. Supp. 2d
1080 (D. Ariz. 2009); Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. T & N Ltd., 191 F.R.D. 522, 529 (E.D. Tex.
2000); Caruso v. Drake Motor Lines, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 586 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Nicholson v. Allied Chem. Corp., 200 F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Pa. 1961); Delapp v. Delapp, 584 S.E.2d 899, 906
(W. Va. 2003); State ex rel. United Mine Workers of Am., Local Union 1938 v. Waters, 489
S.E.2d 266, 276 (W. Va. 1997); Evans v. Holt, 457 S.E.2d 515, 524 (W. Va. 1995); Cnty.
Comm’n v. Hanson, 415 S.E.2d 607, 610 (W. Va. 1992); Cunningham v. Mitchell, 549 So.
2d 955 (Miss. 1989).
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fault likely was willful; (2) the adversary faces significant prejudice; (3) the
defaulting party’s explanation is less plausible; and (4) the defaulting party
probably did not act in good faith.85
In this author’s review of the published cases and in general practice,
the timing of the motion to set aside creates the following results. A motion to set aside default judgment filed within one month of the judgment is
almost always granted.86 When the motion is filed within three months of
the default, the defaulting party generally prevails.87 Motions to set aside

85. See generally Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Semaphore Adver., Inc., 747 F. Supp. 715
(S.D. Ga. 1990); A-Plus Answering Serv., Inc. v. Elmhurst Answering Exch., Inc., 74
F.R.D. 157 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); Seanor v. Bair Transp. Co. of Del., 54 F.R.D. 35 (E.D. Pa.
1971); Groves v. Roy G. Hildreth & Son, Inc., 664 S.E.2d 531, 539–40 (W. Va. 2008);
Realco, LLC v. Apex Rests., Inc., 624 S.E.2d 594, 597 (W. Va. 2005); Cook v. Channel
One, Inc., 549 S.E.2d 306, 310 (W. Va. 2001); Lee v. Gentlemen's Club, Inc., 542 S.E.2d
78, 82 (W. Va. 2000); Overbey v. Murray, 569 So. 2d 303 (Miss. 1990).
86. See, e.g., Seven Elves, 635 F.2d at 399 (noting motion was filed within twelve days
of learning of default judgment); Patapoff, 267 F.2d at 864 (noting appellant moved to vacate ten days after order); Reynal, 153 F.2d at 931–32 (noting motion was filed within thirty
days of default); FOC Fin., 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1083 (noting Defendant filed motion two
days after default was entered); Owens-Illinois, 191 F.R.D. at 529 (noting appellant moved
to vacate three days after it learned of default); Caruso, 78 F.R.D. at 588 (noting motion was
filed less than one month after default entered); Nicholson, 200 F. Supp. at 206 (setting
aside default when motion was filed seventeen days after default was entered).
A similar result is reached in states, such as West Virginia, that have adopted Rules
of Civil Procedure that closely follow the federal system. See, e.g., Delapp, 584 S.E.2d at
906 (noting motion was filed within two days of default); Waters, 489 S.E.2d at 276 (noting
motion was filed within eleven days of default); Evans, 457 S.E.2d at 524 (noting appellant’s motion was filed within one month of learning of default); Hanson, 415 S.E.2d at 610
(noting motion was filed within twenty-five days of default).
Though still modeled on the federal framework, some states do not use a one-year
cutoff in Rule 60 and thus do not fit neatly into the present analysis. For example, Mississippi includes a six-month cutoff date. However, even Mississippi courts recognize that a
motion to set aside default judgment is virtually guaranteed to be granted when made within
one month. See Cunningham v. Mitchell, 549 So. 2d 955, 958 (Miss. 1989) (granting motion after twenty-nine days).
Other states have created their own specific rules as to timing. See, e.g., GA. CODE
ANN. § 9-11-60(f) (2006) (stating that motion to set aside judgment must be brought within
three years unless ground is lack of jurisdiction); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-428 (2007) (establishing that, after 21 days have passed, default judgment can be set aside only on the following grounds: “(i) fraud on the court, (ii) a void judgment, (iii) on proof of an accord and satisfaction, or (iv) on proof that the defendant was, at the time of service of process or entry of
judgment, a person in the military service of the United States”).
87. See, e.g., Allen Russell Publ’g., Inc. v. Levy, 109 F.R.D. 315, 319 (N.D. Ill. 1985)
(granting relief after nine weeks); United States v. 96 Cases of Fireworks, 244 F. Supp. 272,
273 (N.D. Ohio 1965) (noting that only seven weeks passed between default and motion to
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default judgment filed between three and six months have achieved mixed
results.88 The defaulting party generally loses when he or she files a motion after more than six months.89 So long as the court has jurisdiction,90 it
is virtually impossible for a defaulting party to prevail after twelve or more
months have passed because of the one-year cutoff found in Rule 60(c) for
arguing excusable neglect, new evidence, or fraud.91
Under Rule 60(c), a defaulting party can only argue the following
grounds after “more than a year after the entry of the judgment”: the judgment is void; the judgment has been satisfied, released, discharged, or is
based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or any other reason that justifies relief.92 Reading Rule 60 in its entirety, the phrase
“any other reason that justifies relief” cannot possibly include the argu-

set aside); Parsons v. Consol. Gas Supply Corp., 256 S.E.2d 758, 763 (W. Va. 1979) (noting
period of delay was only six weeks).
88. Compare, e.g., Gen. Contracting & Trading Co. v. Interpole, Inc., 899 F.2d 109,
112 (1st Cir. 1990) (denying motion after approximately four months), and United States v.
Topeka Livestock Auction, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 944, 951 (N.D. Ind. 1975) (denying motion
after more than three months), with Falk v. Allen, 739 F.2d 461, 464 (9th Cir. 1984) (granting motion after five months), and Kulakowich v. A/S Borgestad, 36 F.R.D. 185, 186 (E.D.
Pa. 1964) (granting motion after four months).
89. See, e.g., Atlanta Gas Light, 747 F. Supp. at 718 (denying motion after ten months);
Cook, 549 S.E.2d at 310 (denying motion after eleven months); Lee, 542 S.E.2d at 82 (denying motion after seven months).
90. In particular, “courts have failed to develop a uniform rule in Rule 60(b)(4) motions
for allocating the burden of proof on the issue of personal jurisdiction.” Ariel Waldman,
Allocating the Burden of Proof in Rule 60(b)(4) Motions to Vacate A Default Judgment for
Lack of Jurisdiction, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 521, 529 (2001).
Texas state law offers a possible improvement on this issue, requiring “strict compliance” with the service of process rules; otherwise, the default judgment can be set aside
for lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule 60(b)(4). Susan Jean Miller, Misnomers: Default Judgments and Strict Compliance with Service of Process Rules, 46 BAYLOR L. REV.
633, 641–42 (1994) (citing McKanna v. Edgar, 388 S.W.2d 927, 928 (Tex. 1965)).
91. See, e.g., A-Plus Answering Serv., Inc. v. Elmhurst Answering Exch., Inc., 74
F.R.D. 157, 158 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (denying a motion filed one year and two days after entry
of default judgment); Seanor v. Bair Transp. Co. of Del., 54 F.R.D. 35, 36 (E.D. Pa. 1971)
(denying a motion filed thirteen months after entry of default judgment). But see Marquette
Corp. v. Priester, 234 F. Supp. 799, 802–03 (D.S.C. 1964) (granting a motion filed after fifteen months on the grounds that the judgment was void).
Again, the same result is reached in states with a one-year cutoff as part of Rule 60.
See, e.g., Realco, LLC v. Apex Rests., Inc., 624 S.E.2d 594, 597 (W. Va. 2005) (denying
motion after twelve months). But see Groves v. Roy G. Hildreth & Son, Inc., 664 S.E.2d
531, 539-41 (W. Va. 2008) (granting motion after fourteen months).
92. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(c)(1).

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2011

15

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 5
PARK.DOCX

170

1/9/12 12:01 PM

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:155

ments of excusable neglect, new evidence, or fraud.93
IV. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT SYSTEM FROM A PRACTITIONER’S
POINT OF VIEW
From a practitioner’s point of view, the present default judgment system has significant problems for both non-defaulting parties and defaulting
parties. As noted above, excusable neglect is the most common ground for
setting aside a default judgment since the courts have developed a rather
liberal standard.94 When arguing that its failure to timely answer was due
to excusable neglect, the defaulting party concedes that it is to blame and,
in many instances, that it acted negligently. When the court sets aside the
default judgment due to excusable neglect, the defaulting party usually faces little or no adverse consequence for its failure to comply with the Rules
of Civil Procedure and its negligent conduct.95 As one commentator has
noted:
The drafters did not intend the rule to be, nor should it be, a license for parties and their counsel to disregard process or procedural rules with impunity, to fail to exercise due diligence in regard to litigation, or to impede the

93. Pioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 393 (1993)
(stating that the “provisions [of Rule 60(b)] are mutually exclusive, and thus a party who
failed to take timely action due to ‘excusable neglect’ may not seek relief more than a year
after the judgment by resorting to subsection (6)”). In Klapprott v. United States, the Supreme Court said:
[O]f course, the one year limitation would control if no more than “neglect” was
disclosed by the petition. In that event the petitioner could not avail himself of the
broad “any other reason” clause . . . . In simple English, the language of the “other reason” clause, for all reasons except the five particularly specified, vests power
in courts adequate to enable them to vacate judgments whenever such action is
appropriate to accomplish justice.
Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 613–15 (1948). When addressing the issue, the
Seventh Circuit held:
[I]f the asserted grounds for relief fall within the terms of the first three clauses of
Rule 60(b), relief under the catchall provision is not available. The rationale underlying this principle is that the one year time limit applicable to the first three
clauses of Rule 60(b) would be meaningless if relief was also available under the
catchall provision.
Wesco Prods. Co. v. Alloy Auto. Co., 880 F.2d 981, 983 (7th Cir. 1989). For a discussion
of when Rule 60(b)(6) might include excusable neglect in limited circumstances, see infra
Part V.D.
94. See supra Part III.C.2.
95. See 10A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 21, § 2693 (“Although many judges
speak of the importance of compliance with the rules, the punitive value of imposing a default often is subordinated to a preference for a trial on the merits.”).
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efforts of other litigants vigorously pursuing their cases. To condone such
96
behavior makes a mockery of Rule 60(b).

When a properly obtained default judgment is set aside, counsel for the
non-defaulting party is not compensated for his time in obtaining the default, and the court’s time is wasted as the entire litigation returns to square
one, i.e., the filing of a responsive pleading.
After the default judgment has been entered, the prevailing party still
has the Sword of Damocles hovering over its head. The default judgment
will likely be set aside if the defaulting party files its motion within three
months and will almost always be set aside if the motion is filed within one
month.97
One could argue that pre-judgment interest is a sufficient remedy for
the non-defaulting party when a default judgment is set aside; interest is
accruing on his or her damages during the months that the trial was delayed. However, there are two errors in such an argument. First, most civil
cases will ultimately end in a settlement, and thus a binding order with prejudgment interest is rarely entered on the court record. Second, the issue of
fault remains unsettled when a default judgment is set aside. Accordingly,
the non-defaulting party is not guaranteed pre-judgment interest every time
that a default judgment is set aside. While pre-judgment interest may be
somewhat of a factor in settlement negotiations, the possible recovery of
pre-judgment interest is neither a sufficient remedy to the non-defaulting
party nor a sufficient sanction to the defaulting party.
Defaulting parties (or at least parties allegedly in default) face problems with the current framework as well. One example is defaults based on
improper service. The premise of a default is that the party failed to answer
after being served.98 Obviously, that party should only be deemed liable if
it fails to answer after being properly served. However, one of the litigants
often moves for entry of a default and a default judgment based on improper service.99 If the court allows this type of conduct to continue unchecked,
parties will simply file an answer, regardless of whether service was prop-

96. Weathersbee, supra note 62, at 1646.
97. See supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text.
98. Of course, parties often waive formal service of process under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(d). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a)(1)(A), the defendant has either twenty-one days or sixty days to answer, depending on whether he or she waives service.
99. This scenario is especially troubling given that many parties allegedly in default
also fail to appear at the hearing (or challenge the default) since notice is not required.
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er, rather than risk a default.100 Thus, there is also no incentive for the party seeking redress to go to the trouble of rendering proper service when improper service achieves the same result. While a default judgment based on
improper service would eventually be set aside under Rule 60(b)(4),101 the
current system does not properly discourage counsel from effecting improper service.
Perhaps the most troubling problem facing the defaulting party is manipulation of the one-year cutoff date for making certain arguments in the
motion to set aside.102 As discussed above, the cutoff date found in Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c) plays a substantial role in whether a motion
to set aside default judgment will be granted.103 When the defaulting party
fails to file its motion within the one-year timeframe, the default judgment
will almost always be upheld.104 The prevailing party generally has multiple years (even decades in some states) to collect on a judgment,105 so the
prevailing party does not have to begin its collection attempts right away.
This situation is exacerbated by the fact that the defaulting party is not entitled to receive notice from the court that a final judgment has been entered
against it.106 What should happen if the non-defaulting party intentionally
attempted to manipulate the one-year cutoff date of Rule 60?
In Hartwell v. Marquez, the West Virginia Supreme Court noted its
concern over that possible scenario.107 After receiving the plaintiff’s complaint, the defendant’s insurer failed to timely answer.108 The plaintiff then
obtained an entry of default and a default judgment, with damages being
calculated by the court under Rule 55(b)(2).109 After the judgment was entered, plaintiff’s counsel took no action until the Rule 60 cutoff date

100. In practice, a motion to dismiss for insufficient process or insufficient service of
process under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) simply results in proper service at a
later date and increased costs.
101. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(4).
102. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(c)(1). Some states have adopted a version of Rule 60 with a cutoff date other than one-year. See, e.g., MISS. R. CIV. P. 60(b) (providing for a six-month
cutoff date).
103. See supra notes 91–92 and accompanying text.
104. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
105. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 38-3-18(a) (2005) (giving the prevailing party a tenyear, renewable period to collect on judgment).
106. See FED. R. CIV. P. 77(d)(1).
107. Hartwell v. Marquez, 498 S.E.2d 1, 4 n.5 (W. Va. 1997).
108. Id. at 3.
109. Id. at 4, 10.
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passed.110 Just after the cutoff date, plaintiff’s counsel began the collections process.111 The Hartwell Court noted that “[t]his delay was apparently calculated to limit [the defaulting party’s] options under the provisions
of W. VA. R. CIV. P. 60(b).”112 While such a delay did not technically violate any statutory or court rule,113 the West Virginia Supreme Court
“strongly urge[d]” practitioners to avoid the practice.114 In addition, the
Hartwell Court implied that such conduct likely violates the ethical rules of
conduct for attorneys.115
V. HOW TO IMPROVE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT FRAMEWORK
While the current default judgment framework suffers from a number
of ills, the system could be greatly improved with a few simple changes.
These changes include amending Rule 55 to allow for the recovery of attorney’s fees, making attorney’s fees a condition to setting aside a default
judgment, considering alternative sanctions as a factor, and viewing failure
to execute within one year as a factor under Rule 60(b)(6). Although attor-

110. Id. at 4. As of 1997, Rule 60 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure provided for an eight-month cutoff date; the current version includes a one-year timeframe.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 4 n.5.
113. Although failing to inform the defendant’s insurer of the default judgment has been
held to constitute “misconduct of an adverse party” under Rule 60(b)(3), McGee v. Reynolds, 618 N.E.2d 40, 41 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993), that subsection is still subject to the one-year
limitation. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(c). For analysis of McGee, see William F. Harvey, Default
Judgment—Set Aside Because of Attorney’s Misconduct and Other Grounds, 37 RES
GESTAE 466, 466–67 (1994).
114. Hartwell, 498 S.E.2d at 4 n.5.
115. Id. (citing W. VA. STANDARDS OF PROF’L CONDUCT S. I.B.9). See also MODEL
RULES OF. PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2002) (“A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and
promptness.”); id. R. 3.2 (“A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation.”);
id. R. 3.2 cmt. (1983) (“Delay should not be indulged merely . . . for the purpose of frustrating an opposing party’s attempt to obtain rightful redress or repose. . . .”); id. R. 3.4 (2002)
(addressing general fairness to opposing party and opposing counsel).
However, ethical rules, standing alone, are probably insufficient to solve the problems associated with default judgments. See Adam Owen Glist, Enforcing Courtesy: Default Judgments and the Civility Movement, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 757, 785 (2000). Glist
noted that
[c]ivility codes, despite their rhetoric, too often focus on narrow “craft” standards--such as when to forbear seeking a default judgment. When this prohibition is
examined closely, it appears rooted in a reflexive nostalgia. Advocates of greater
civility should offer, rather than simple pleas, straightforward procedural reforms
that benefit both lawyers and the unrepresented.
Id.
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ney’s fees are generally not awarded under the American rule,116 making
such an award available within the court’s discretion for default judgments
would encourage compliance with procedural rules, reduce the prejudice
suffered by the non-defaulting party when a default judgment is set aside,
and punish failure to comply with procedural rules without imposing the
drastic remedy of a default judgment.
A. Amend Rule 55 to Allow for the Recovery of Attorney’s Fees
It is certainly nothing new for a rule of civil procedure to allow the
judge to award reasonable attorney’s fees. For example, the court may order an award of attorney’s fees when a party violates Rule 11,117 submits an
improper discovery document,118 impedes or frustrates the fair examination
in a deposition,119 fails to appear for a deposition,120 or imposes an undue
burden through the use of a subpoena.121
Rule 37 regarding motions to compel the production of documents
would serve as a good model. Rule 37 gives the judge discretion to award
attorney’s fees to either party depending on whether the motion to compel
is granted or denied.122 Using Rule 37 as a guide, Rule 55(c) should be
amended to include the following language:
The court may set aside an entry of default for good cause, and it may set
aside a default judgment under Rule 60(b).
(1) If the Motion to Set Aside Is Granted. If the motion to set aside is
granted, the court may, after giving an opportunity to be heard, require the
non-defaulting party to pay the defaulting party’s reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney’s fees, or require the defaulting party to pay the non-defaulting party’s reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the default or default judgment, including attorney’s
fees. But the court must not order this payment if the party’s action was
substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of expenses
unjust.
(2) If the Motion to Set Aside Is Denied. If the motion to set aside is de116. See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1973) (“Although the traditional American rule
ordinarily disfavors the allowance of attorneys’ fees in the absence of statutory or contractual authorization, federal courts, in the exercise of their equitable powers, may award attorneys’ fees when the interests of justice so require.”).
117. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(2).
118. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(3).
119. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(d)(2).
120. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(g).
121. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(1).
122. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(5).
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nied, the court may, after giving an opportunity to be heard, require the defaulting party to pay the non-defaulting party’s reasonable expenses incurred, including attorney’s fees, in (i) obtaining the default or default
judgment, and (ii) opposing the motion to set aside. But the court must not
order this payment if the motion to set aside was substantially justified or
123
other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.

Rule 55 should be amended to give judges discretion to award a reasonable attorney’s fee to either party.124 Attorney’s fees should be considered on a case-by-case basis. In cases involving clearly improper service,
attorney’s fees could be awarded to the allegedly defaulting party.125 When
the court sets aside a default judgment for excusable neglect, attorney’s
fees could be awarded to the non-defaulting party to compensate counsel
for obtaining the default judgment and to reduce the prejudice on the nondefaulting party. If the federal version of Rule 55 is amended to allow attorney’s fees, most states will likely follow suit. However, if Rule 55 is not
amended on the federal level, the individual states should take it upon
themselves to amend their own versions of Rule 55.
B. Attorney’s Fees as a Condition to Setting Aside Default Judgment
Under the current framework, a number of courts have set aside a default judgment only upon the condition that the defaulting party be responsible for the non-defaulting party’s related attorney’s fees.126 Reasonable

123. Granted, such an amendment is not necessary in the circuits, as discussed infra
Parts V.B–C, that use attorney’s fees as a condition to setting aside default judgment or consider the availability of lesser sanctions as a factor. However, a number of circuits and
states do not use these methods. Amending Rule 55 would be a quick, nationwide solution
that would not require piecemeal implementation by the courts.
124. Rule 55 covers both defaults and default judgments whereas Rule 60 is the controlling standard for setting aside all types of judgment. In other words, all defaults must run
through Rule 55. However, amending Rule 60 would solve the attorney’s fee issue for default judgments, but not mere defaults. In addition, allowing attorney’s fees for the setting
aside of judgments based on excusable neglect, fraud, etc. would also make sense.
125. Attorney’s fees would not be warranted for a technically improper service that was
made in good faith.
126. See, e.g., Coon v. Grenier, 867 F.2d 73, 79 (1st Cir. 1989); Weary v. Sailorman,
Inc., No. CIVA2:07CV3KS-MTP, 2008 WL 321510, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 4, 2008); U.S.
Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Petroleo Brasileiro S.A., 220 F.R.D. 404, 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2004);
Goodwin v. Roper Indus., Inc., 113 F.R.D. 53, 55 (D. Me. 1986); Leab v. Streit, 584 F.
Supp. 748, 763 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
Although not modeled on the federal rules, Virginia allows the court to use recovery
of attorney’s fees as a condition when setting aside a default judgment. VA. SUP. CT. R.
3:19(d)(1).
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conditions may be imposed in granting a motion to set aside default judgment, and the condition most commonly imposed is that the defaulting party must reimburse the non-defaulting party for costs incurred because of the
default.127 After all, Rule 60(b) states that the court may set aside a judgment “[o]n motion and just terms.”128 As the Ninth Circuit has explained:
By conditioning the setting aside of a default, any prejudice suffered by
the non-defaulting party as a result of the default and the subsequent reopening of the litigation can be rectified. . . . [T]he most common type of
prejudice is the additional expense caused by the delay, the hearing on the
Rule 55(c) motion, and the introduction of new issues. Courts have eased
these burdens by requiring the defaulting party to provide a bond to pay
costs, to pay court costs, or to cover the expenses of the appeal. The use of
imposing conditions can serve to “promote the positive purposes of the default procedures without subjecting either litigant to their drastic conse129
quences.”

In addition, this method is not overly burdensome on all defaulting
parties since it is only invoked on a case-by-case basis.130 Imposing a reasonable attorney’s fee as a condition “can be used to rectify any prejudice
suffered by the non-defaulting party as a result of the default and the subsequent reopening of the litigation.”131 Again, the court should have broad
discretion given the vast possibility of factual scenarios involved, rather
than automatically awarding attorney’s fees in every case.132

It appears this idea has been around for almost one hundred years but has not been
uniformly applied. See Keeler Bros. v. Yellowstone Valley Nat. Bank, 235 F. 270, 271 (D.
Mont. 1916) (setting aside default judgment on condition that defaulting party “pays all accrued costs and an attorney’s attendance fee herein of $25”).
127. Wokan v. Alladin Int’l, Inc., 485 F.2d 1232, 1234 (3d Cir. 1973) (citing J. M.
Purver, Annotation, Propriety of Conditions Imposed in Granting Relief from Judgment Under Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), 3 A.L.R. FED. 956 (1970)); Thorpe v. Thorpe, 364 F.2d
692, 694 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (collecting cases).
128. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b).
129. Nilsson, Robbins, Dalgarn, Berliner, Carson & Wurst v. La. Hydrolec, 854 F.2d
1538, 1546 (9th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted) (quoting 10A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 21, § 2700).
130. See Na Pali Haweo Cmty. Ass’n v. Grande, 252 F.R.D. 672, 674 (D. Haw. 2008)
(recognizing the availability of attorney’s fees but choosing not to award them); Pall Corp.
v. Entegris, Inc., 249 F.R.D. 48, 52 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (refusing to grant attorney’s fees based
on court’s discretion).
131. 10A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 21, § 2700 (noting that prejudice to a
non-defaulting party usually takes the form of an “additional expense caused by the delay,
the hearing on the Rule 55(c) motion, and the introduction of new issues”).
132. See id. (“The use of conditions also permits the court to be responsive to the special
problems raised by particular situations in order to avoid possible inequities.”).
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Consider Alternative Sanctions as a Factor

A split of authority exists on whether alternative sanctions, such as
costs and attorney’s fees, should be considered as a factor when hearing a
motion to set aside default judgment.133 The Third and Fourth Circuits
have expressly stated that the district court must consider alternative sanctions as a factor.134 The other circuits, however, have not ruled out alternative sanctions from consideration. When hearing a motion to set aside default judgment, every court should consider the effectiveness of alternative
sanctions as one of the factors. This is particularly true in federal courts
where persuasive authorities from other circuits are routinely cited.
An informative case is Burton v. Continental Casualty Company out
of the District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.135 The Burton
court cited the Fourth Circuit’s factors for setting aside a default judgment,
including the effectiveness of alternative sanction, rather than the Fifth Circuit’s factors.136 Similarly, the District Court for the Southern District of
Florida quoted the Eleventh Circuit’s general case law on default judgments, then cited the Third Circuit factors (including alternative sanctions),
and ultimately imposed attorney’s fees on the defaulting party.137 The factors a court decides to use, regardless of which circuit they come from, are
“simply means of identifying circumstances which warrant the finding of
‘good cause’ to set aside a default.”138 Since alternative sanctions have not
been ruled out, more courts, both state and federal, should follow these persuasive authorities and consider the effectiveness of alternative sanctions as
a factor when ruling on a motion to set aside default judgment.
D. Failure to Execute Within One Year as a Factor Under Rule 60(b)(6)
One of the most troubling problems with the current default judgment
framework is the possible manipulation of the one-year cutoff of Rule 60.
To solve this conundrum, the courts should proceed under Rule 60(b)(6)
when the non-defaulting party sits on the judgment for more than one year
without contacting the defaulting party.139 This would be akin to the equi133. See supra Part III.C.1.
134. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
135. Burton v. Cont’l Cas. Co, 431 F. Supp. 2d 651 (S.D. Miss. 2006).
136. Id. at 657.
137. Saperstein v. Palestinian Auth., No. 04-20225-CIV, 2008 WL 4467535, at *11–12
(S.D. Fla. Sept. 29, 2008).
138. Id. at *12 (quoting Lexington Lasercomb I.P.A.G. v. Unger, 234 F.R.D. 701, 702
(S.D. Fla. 2006)).
139. One could also argue in favor of requiring the non-defaulting party to give additional notice to the defaulting party. However, this author does not find such an argument com-
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table doctrine of unclean hands.140 In essence, the prevailing party’s failure
to execute on the judgment within one year should be considered by the
courts as a factor towards “any other reason that justifies relief” under Rule
60(b)(6). In certain situations, the defaulting party should be allowed to
argue excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence, or fraud despite the
technical one-year cutoff date if the non-defaulting party fails to contact the
defaulting party within one year of the judgment.141 After all, Rule
60(b)(6) “provides a grand reservoir of equitable power to do justice in a
particular case.”142
A good example of this approach can be found in Byron v. Bleakley

pelling. So long as there has been proper service, the defaulting party has already received
the pleading but failed to act accordingly. In addition, the non-defaulting party may not
have an accurate mailing address, there might not be an attorney of record, and the original
pleading may often be filed through the Secretary of State. Further, placing an additional
requirement on the non-defaulting party and its counsel would further compound the problem of lack of compensation for attorney’s fees. In addition, the summons must, inter alia,
“notify the defendant that a failure to appear and defend will result in a default judgment
against the defendant for the relief demanded in the complaint.” FED. R. CIV. P. 4(a)(1)(E).
The Supreme Court has stated:
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding
which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford
them an opportunity to present their objections. The notice must be of such nature
as reasonably to convey the required information, and it must afford a reasonable
time for those interested to make their appearance. But if with due regard for the
practicalities and peculiarities of the case these conditions are reasonably met the
constitutional requirements are satisfied.
Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314–15 (1950) (citations omitted).
140. See, e.g., Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806,
814 (1945) (noting “the equitable maxim that ‘he who comes into equity must come with
clean hands’”). At least one court has implied that the prevailing party’s delay in collecting
could constitute laches, abandonment, or estoppel under Rule 60(b)(6) if the defaulting party
could show prejudice, such as depletion of previously available funds or lapse of previously
available insurance. Wheeler v. Springfield Sugar & Prods. Co., 447 N.E.2d 13, 15 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1983).
141. As discussed supra note 93 and accompanying text, a showing of excusable neglect,
new evidence, or fraud, when standing alone, is not sufficient to constitute “any other reason
that justifies relief” under Rule 60(b)(6).
142. Transaero, Inc. v. La Fuerza Area Boliviana, 24 F.3d 457, 461 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting 7 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 60.27[2], at 295 (2d ed.
1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The federal courts have been known to take a
broad number of factors into consideration under Rule 60(b)(6). See Suburban Janitorial
Servs. v. Clarke Am., 863 P.2d 1377, 1383 n.17 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993) (collecting federal
cases).
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Transportation Company.143 The defaulting party moved to vacate the
judgment after two years had passed.144 Even though the defaulting party’s
grounds may have appeared to constitute excusable neglect at first glance,
there were additional factors at play: (1) affidavits established a possible
meritorious defense; (2) the action was brought one day from the expiration
of the statute of limitations; (3) the defaulting party was no longer engaged
in the active conduct of that line of business; and (4) plaintiff made no attempt to execute on the judgment until eighteen months had passed.145
Specifically, the court chose to “view the matter with special care” given
the lack of any attempt to collect on the judgment by the one-year cutoff
date.146
Using the Rules to the best advantage of one’s client is good advocacy and
the court casts no aspersions on plaintiff’s counsel. But where the net result of adhering to the letter of the Rules is to thwart rather than to promote
justice, the court must be wary of their rigid application. . . . [I]n an unusual
case such as this the court should not be handicapped by the Rules, which
147
are to be construed liberally to achieve justice.

With all of these factors in mind, the court set aside the default judgment as “any other reason that justifies relief” under Rule 60(b)(6).148
More courts should accept the logic and reasoning of Byron and consider
the lack of execution within one year as a factor under Rule 60(b)(6).149
VI. CONCLUSION
The current default judgment framework is fraught with problems and
inequities, including procedural violations on both sides that often go unchecked. The primary remedy to these ills is amending Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to allow the court discretion in awarding attorney’s fees. The court needs to have the authority to award attorney’s
fees to the non-defaulting party or to the allegedly defaulting party based
on the facts of each case. If Rule 55 is not amended, both state and federal
143. Byron v. Bleakley Transp. Co., 43 F.R.D. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
144. Id. at 414.
145. Id. at 415.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 415–16 (citations omitted).
148. Id. at 416. For the improper, laissez faire approach, see Allison v. Boondock’s,
Sundecker’s & Greenthumb’s, Inc., 673 P.2d 634, 638 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983) (refusing to
set aside default judgment despite finding that the non-defaulting party’s counsel “used the
civil rules to her advantage [by] waiting more than a year to execute the judgment.”).
149. See Sasso v. M. Fine Lumber Co., Inc., 144 F.R.D. 185, 188–89 (E.D.N.Y. 1992)
(considering as a factor “plaintiffs’ diligent efforts . . . to collect on the default judgment”).
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courts should consider attorney’s fees as a condition or a factor to setting
aside the default judgment. In addition, the courts should take into account
the prevailing party’s failure to execute on the judgment within one year as
a factor towards “any other reason that justifies relief” under Rule 60(b)(6).
With these improvements implemented, there will be fewer faults with the
default judgment system.
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